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Les produits forestiers en tant qu’outil de gestion du risque 
 
L’incomplétude des marché d’assurance est une lacune récurrente dans les pays en développement. Dans ce 
contexte, les ménages pauvres des régions rurales exploitent souvent les propriétés en ressource commune en 
tant qu’outil de gestion du risque en cas de pénurie. Cet article étudie les implications de ce type d’utilisation sur 
le couvert forestier, et donc la déforestation, ainsi que sur l’intensité de l’utilisation des ressources. Le modèle de 
choix d’utilisation des terres est ainsi proche d’un modèle de portefeuille entre une activité risquée, l’agriculture, 
et  un  outil  de  gestion  du  risque,  l’extraction  de  produits  forestiers.  D’autre  part,  il  est  démontré  que  cette 
stratégie d’assurance peut conduire à une trappe de pauvreté, par un mécanisme de tragédie des communs.   
 





Incompleteness of insurance markets is a crucial weakness of developing countries. In this context, the poor 
households of rural regions often exploit common property resources, such as forests, as insurance in case of 
economics stress. The aim of this paper is to derive the implications of this insurance use on the forest cover, 
and  thus  on  deforestation.  The  land-use  choice  between  agricultural  land  and  forest  therefore  resembles  a 
portfolio  diversification.  However,  I  also  show  that  this  insurance  strategy  may  lead  to  resource  over-
exploitation and constitute a poverty trap. 
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Insurance markets of rural regions in developing countries are often incomplete, if not non-
existent. This situation gives non-conventional insurance systems an important role. Among
these systems, common property resources (CPR) appear to have an important insurance
role. Several case studies have studied the insurance role of commonly held resources, such
as forests, commonly held lands or even ﬁsheries.
A particular activity is often used as a safety net 1: Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP)
extraction2. Populations of interest here are farming communities that rely on forest as a
supplementary source of income (Byron and Arnold, 1999). In case of bad agricultural crops,
the households extract NTFP from the forest in order to smooth their consumption.
The aim of this paper is to understand the impact of this insurance use of forest products
on the land-use choice. Indeed, agricultural expansion appears to be the most important
cause of deforestation. The share of deforestation related to agricultural expansion has been
estimated at at least 50 per cent (Myers, 1992; UNEP, 1992) and at 70 per cent in the
1990’s (UNEP, 2003). In Africa, which is the area with the highest deforestation rates in the
world, more than 50 per cent of the deforested zones were switched into small exploitations.
Simultaneously, agricultural development is an important tool for poverty alleviation and
long term development (World Bank; 2000). The consequences of this insurance role of
NTFP extraction on deforestation is thus an interesting issue and can be investigated with
farm household models - a priority for future research (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1998).
Some papers have studied the safety-net role of common property resources, such as
forests (Agarwal, 1991 ; Baland and Francois, 2004 ; Pattanayak and Sills, 2001), but they
do not consider the impact of this role on the land-use decision. However the households face
a trade-oﬀ between forest and agriculture. Agriculture can be a way to alleviate poverty,
but is a risky activity, while NTFP extraction has low poverty alleviation potential, but is a
useful tool to compensate for agricultural risk. This paper investigates therefore the impact
of the use of NTFP as safety nets on the household’s decision to increase their agricultural
land, and thus, to clear forests.
1Among other insurance mechanisms: inter-household solidarity, livestock...
2The term ”non-timber forest product”encompasses all biological materials other than timber which are
extracted from forests for human use.
1The safety-net use of NTFP extraction may take two forms, corresponding to two kinds
of risk-management strategies. First, the diversiﬁcation strategy is equivalent to a portfolio
analysis, because the households use NTFP extraction as a risk-free asset (Aldermann and
Paxson, 1994). Second, the coping strategy consists of extracting NTFP only when agricul-
tural output is too low, working as a ”natural”insurance mechanism. Therefore, the problem
for the local communities has both the characteristics of portfolio analysis and economics
of insurance. The paper focuses on the diversiﬁcation strategy. The household chooses ex
ante the share of land dedicated to agriculture and the share of land dedicated to NTFP
extraction. The analysis of a coping strategy would induce a diﬀerent timing of the land-use
choice and the allocation of labor.
To investigate the impact of the use of NTFP as a risk-management strategy, we build
on Angelsen (1999). Our extension allows for agricultural crops uncertainty and for NTFP
extraction, neither of which is considered in Angelsen (1999). Thus the model is an expected
utility maximization process of a risk-averse household which uses forest products to face
agricultural crops uncertainty. We assume a community that does not have access to insur-
ance nor credit market, so that the risk-management use of forest products is the only way
to deal with crop risks.
In this context, the comparative statics show that risk reduction, lower risk aversion and
larger population may be important factors of deforestation. Moreover, forest proﬁtability
is unambiguously positively correlated with the forest cover.
Angelsen and Wunder (2003) notes that this activity can constitute a poverty trap for
poorer households. Azariadis and Stachuski (in Aghion and Durlauf, 2006) deﬁne a poverty
trap as a ”self reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to persist”. Thus determining
the conditions under which a CPR constitutes both a safety net and a poverty trap is also
an important issue. I deﬁne a poverty trap as a situation in which households cannot get
more than their subsistence requirement from their activities. In the case considered here,
households are ”trapped”in CPR extraction activity because of their need of insurance, which
keeps them away from other development opportunities. CPR extraction can constitute a
poverty trap as a result of a tragedy-of-the-commons process. Too much households are
in need of insurance and the resource cannot provide enough to properly insure all the
2population. They face thus the classic poverty-environment nexus, where poor people depend
too much of their environment and overuse it.
Section 2 gives a brief review of the literature, emphasizing the use of NTFP for poor
agricultural households, describing the economics of land-use in agricultural areas and the
insurance properties of common property resources. Section 3 presents a household model
of land-use choice with risk on agricultural output and NTFP extraction used as safety net.
Section 4 shows how a CPR may constitute both a safety net and a poverty trap. Finally
section 5 concludes and discusses the policy implications.
2 Review of the literature
2.1 The safety-net use of non-timber forest products
In developing countries, about 1.2 billion people rely on agroforestry farming systems that
help to sustain agricultural productivity and generate income (World Bank, 2001). The
risk-management role of forest products is particularly important in the rural regions of
developing countries, given that agricultural crops face many types of risk, such as price
shocks, seasonal ﬂooding, unpredictable soil quality, pests, crop diseases or illnesses. NTFP
can be used directly in consumption or sold to ﬁll cash gaps. Formally, rural households,
which have limited credit and insurance options, choose a diversiﬁcation of their activities
(thus of the land use), in order to reduce aggregate risk (Morduch, 1995; Godoy et al., 1998).
Some studies analyze this use of NTFP (Baland and Francois, 2004; Pattanayak and Sills,
2001). One of the results is that any individual is more likely to visit the forest if the crops
are more risky or if he faces a negative shock. Godoy et al. (2000), in a study in Honduras,
argue that although NTFP extraction has a low annual value, it can provide insurance in
the case of unexpected losses. This risk-management role can be particularly important in
the case of common risk, because intra-village credit or insurance systems are more diﬃcult
to implement (Dercon, 2002).
Two risk-management strategies may be implemented (Angelsen and Wunder, 2002). The
diversiﬁcation strategy (usually observed in Latin America) is a classic risk-management tool
(Aldermann and Paxson, 1994). The household raises ex ante the number of its activities,
3choosing if possible activities that have low covariance. In contrast, the coping strategy
(observed in Africa) consists of extracting NTFP only in the case of bad agricultural crops.
The use of NTFP can here be considered as an ex post gap ﬁlling use. Forest products are
extracted in order to smooth the household’s consumption in case of low crop returns.
In these two risk-management approaches, NTFP extraction appears to be eﬃcient for
poor rural households. First, a large variety of NTFP can be extracted, thus raising the di-
versiﬁcation of activities. Several studies mention fuel, fodder, ﬁbres, oil seeds, edible fruits,
staple foods, vegetables, spices, rope, leaf-plates, medicinal plants, vines, honey, sap, Brazil-
ian nuts, fruits bark and rubber (Kumar (2002), for rural India; Pattanayak and Sills (2001),
for the Tapajos National Forest, Brazilian Amazon). Second, many NTFP do not have
strong positive correlation among themselves or with agricultural output (Pattayanak and
Sills, 2001), so that they can be eﬃcient risk-management instruments. A bad agricultural
output is not necessarily linked to bad forest product quantities.
Two characteristics of NTFP are important to note. First, there are low capital and skills
requirements to NTFP extraction as well as open or semi-open access to the resource, so
that poor households can easily extract the resource. Neumann and Hirsch (2000) argue that
the poorest people are those who are the most engaged in NTFP extraction. Second, NTFP
habitually have low return to labor, so that they have poor potential to alleviate poverty
(Wunder, 2001; Angelsen and Wunder, 2002). Studying Bagyeli and Bantu communities
in South Cameroon, Van Dijk (in Ros-Tonen and Wiersum (2003)) gives an illustration of
the relatively low share of NTFP in total income -which argues for the risk-management
strategies- and of the link between poverty and NTFP use.
Hence, forests are competing for the land-use, with agriculture representing the most
important alternative. Indeed, forest products have a low potential of poverty alleviation,
but can be used to compensate shortfalls in agricultural yields. Conversely, agricultural
crops is a potential way out of poverty for households, but may represent a high levels of
risk, especially if the households have low access to insurance or credit markets. The trade-oﬀ
between these two land-uses is a major choice for poor rural households, and is a potentially
driving force of deforestation. An interesting topic is thus to analyze the land-use choice
process of the households.
42.2 The land-use choice literature and NTFP extraction
Among the papers studying the land-use choice by rural communities, only few take into
account the forest products use, and none study the risk-management use described here.
Lopez (1998) notes the coexistence in most developing countries of private lands, intended
for agricultural crops, and common property lands, namely forests, used for their products.
In his paper, the two land-uses compete with each other, but forest products extraction is
not a risk-management strategy. Speciﬁcally, Lopez analyzes the consequences of agricultural
intensiﬁcation and farm productivity improvement programs on the pressures on the common
resource. The main factor determining the programs’ impact on pressure on the common
resource is the factor-intensity of the crops. If crops are labor-intensive, then a rise in their
prices is likely to diminish the pressure on the common resource. However, if crops are
land-intensive, the pressure is likely to rise with the commodity prices.
Parks et al. (1998) study the competing land-uses, mainly agriculture, timber and non-
timber forest products. The paper distinguishes four cases, depending on the relative produc-
tivity of the diﬀerent activities: joint management of forests, forest preservation, conversion
to non-forest use, and forest abandonment. These four cases depend mainly on the impact
of the age of the trees and the management eﬀort on a proﬁt maximization function.
2.3 Common property resources as safety net
The literature on land-use choice discussed above ignores the safety-net role that forests
have when they are commonly held. Another part of the literature does, however, argue the
importance of common property resources (CPR) as safety net. Baland and Francois (2005)
analyze the insurance property of CPR, and compare it with the increased eﬃciency if this
resource is privatized. In their paper, each household has the choice between two activities:
CPR extraction and a private project. CPR extraction requires low skilled labor, which
implies homogenous returns to labor. The private projects provide heterogenous returns,
depending on the households skills. Therefore, CPR extraction represents for low skilled
households an outside option to private project, while the most skilled households allocate
their labor to the private projects. The authors found a potential negative impact of the
privatization of the resource on the welfare of the community’s poorest members.
5Pattanayak and Sills (2001) ﬁnd that NTFP collection is positively correlated with agri-
cultural shortfall and expected agricultural risk. According to Bromley and Chavas (1989),
non-exclusive property rights can be seen as an integral part of risk sharing. In this case, the
common forest can be considered as an asset of last resort (Baland and Francois, 2005). A
strong link between poor people and CPR is often underlined. Dasgupta and Maler (1993)
argue that local commons provide the rural poor with partial protection in time of unusual
economic stress. A study of tribal groups in rural Bihar qualiﬁes communally-held forests as
the only means of survival for poorer members in lean seasons (Agrawal, 1991). Reddy and
Chahravaty (1999) observe in India a more intensive use of the CPR by poor households.
Dasgupta (1987) notes a higher level of CPR products in low labor productivity regions.
Johda (1986) ﬁnds a negative relationship between CPR income and rural inequalities.
Although some papers study the competing land-use relationship between agriculture and
forests, none of them investigate the safety-net use of forest products to insure against crops
risk. In contrast, papers studying the safety-net role of CPR treat the share private/common
land as exogenous. The aim of this paper is thus to reconcile these two sides of the literature,
investigating the role of the safety-net use of NTFP on the land-use choice.
3 Diversiﬁcation strategy, risk-aversion and house-
hold’s optimal land-use
The model presented is an adaptation from Angelsen (1999). In contrast to Angelsen’s set-
up, agricultural output is uncertain and forest provides NTFP that are used to smooth the
household’s consumption when the agricultural output is bad.
The set-up for the land: The model represents a village economy. The total area of the
village is normalized to 1. We assume here only two possible uses for the land: agriculture
and forests. Both agricultural and forested areas are assumed to have the same quality. In
contrast to Angelsen (1999), we assume that forests provide Non-Timber Forest Products
(NTFP). We assume for simplicity an egalitarian repartition of the land across the households
in the village. Therefore, we consider a representative household, which has a share 1
N of the
total area of the village (N is the number of households in the village and is our indicator
6of population pressure), which is equivalent to a share 1
N of total forest product extraction.
We avoid thus the tragedy of the commons problem, i.e competition between households for
the forest products. We also assume that both the agricultural good and the forest product
are homogenous. For both goods, land and labor are the only inputs. We assume that the
household uses an optimal combination of labor in the production process. Thus the labor
side is not explicitly considered here. The implicit assumption is that the household’s labor
force is entirely used and that the household may eventually hire outside labor 3.
R is the share of agricultural land in the village area (0 ≤ R ≤ 1). Agricultural land
area used by the household is thus deﬁned as R
N and forest land area for the representative
household use is 1−R
N . R is an indicator of the agricultural land cover and the choice variable
of the household. At the beginning of the period, the household chooses the share of the
land it will cultivate. If R = 1, all the land around the village is converted to agriculture and
deforestation is maximized in the village area. If R = 0, forest conservation is maximized
and there is no agriculture. Between these two extreme cases, there is a trade-oﬀ between
the two possible uses of the land.
The safety-net use of forest products: We focus here on the diversiﬁcation strategy,
i.e. the land-use choice (inducing the labor allocation) is made ex ante. We assume that
agricultural land is, on average, more proﬁtable than forest land, but agricultural production
is more volatile than NTFP. Thus, there is a trade-oﬀ between a relatively more proﬁtable
but riskier activity - agriculture - and a relatively less proﬁtable but safer activity - NTFP
extraction. In contrast to Angelsen (1999), the agricultural output is not certain. The risk
on agricultural crops is supposed to be systemic. Therefore every household in the village
lives in the same state of the world. Thus there cannot be inter-household insurance.
There are two states of the world. In the good state, which occurs with probability δ, the




[Rx + (1 − R)f] (1)
3For an analysis of the interactions between labor market and deforestation, see Bluﬀstone (1995).
7where x is the optimal agricultural output (net of costs) per hectare in the good state of the
world. f is the quantity of forest products extracted per hectare, net of extraction costs. In
contrast to the agricultural output, f is assumed to be certain.




[Rx + (1 − R)f] (2)
x is the optimal agricultural output in the bad state of the world. Clearly x < x must
hold. Expected agricultural output per hectare is therefore:
E(x) = δx + (1 − δ)x (3)
Clearly, by assumption f < E(x), for otherwise there is no trade-oﬀ between the two
land-uses and all the land is used for forest product extraction.
3.1 Expected utility maximization
The objective of the household is to maximize its expected utility. The household’s utility
function only depends on consumption: U = U(C), with ∂U
∂C > 0. A quick mean-variance
analysis may be done before considering the household’s optimal trade-oﬀ.
Mean-variance analysis: Both the expected level of consumption and its variance depend
on the share of agricultural land, R, to be chosen by the household.
The household can either consume directly what it produces or sell it to purchase other
goods. Thus we consider the equality between consumption and production as a budget








Expected consumption rises with the share of agricultural land, R, since expected agri-
cultural production is more eﬃcient than forest product extraction. Therefore, a risk-neutral
household would convert all the land into ﬁelds (R = 1) in order to maximize its expected









8Clearly the variance of consumption is strictly increasing in R. Thus the choice in the
land-use is a trade-oﬀ between expected consumption and variance of consumption. The
relative weight given to the expected consumption and the variance will depend on its risk-
aversion: a risk-averse household gives more importance to the variance of consumption,
than a risk-neutral household.
Household’s objective and the optimal trade-oﬀ: We introduce a Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion (CARA) function, with α being the Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion
coeﬃcient:
U(C) = −exp[−αC] (5)
Expected utility is then:
EU(R) = −δ exp[−αC(R)] − (1 − δ) exp[−αC(R)] (6)






∂R > 0 if f ≤ x. Therefore, we have a corner solution (R = 1) if the forest
proﬁtability is lower than or equal to the agricultural proﬁtability in the bad state of the
world. In this framework, the safety-net use of the forest products only exists if the risk
on agricultural output is so high that NTFP extraction becomes the main activity of the
household in the bad state of the world. This condition is consistent with a portfolio analysis,
where the risk-free asset needs to be more proﬁtable than the risky asset in some states of
the world to have a positive share in the portfolio (Gollier, 2001). We now characterize










In this framework of risk on agricultural output, we deﬁne risk reduction as a rise in x and
a fall in x, with a constant expected output E(x). This kind of risk reduction can be viewed
9as the introduction of an insurance system. On the one hand, the household pays a risk
premium dx per hectare in the good state of the world. On the other hand, if the bad state
of the world occurs, the household receives as insurance dx per hectare. This risk reduction
deﬁnition implies (1 − δ)dx = −δdx, with dx > 0.
Proposition 1 : When NTFP extraction is used as a diversiﬁcation strategy, risk re-
duction, lower risk aversion and larger population decrease the forest cover. Moreover, the
forest proﬁtability is positively correlated with the forest cover.





∂x ) > 0,
∂R∗
∂α < 0, ∂R∗
∂N > 0 and ∂R∗
∂f < 0.
Risk reduction has a positive impact on R. Hence, if the agricultural risk is reduced, the
safety-net use of NTFP is less important, agricultural land increases and forest cover declines.
Intuitively, if the more proﬁtable activity becomes less risky - with the same expected prof-
itability -, its share in the agent’s portfolio raises. In our example, the introduction of an
insurance mechanism thus leads to more deforestation.
The Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion coeﬃcient has a positive impact on the forest
cover. Intuitively, if the household is risk averse, it keeps more land as forest in order to insure
itself against crop risks, even if this is done at the expense of lower expected consumption.
The village population has a negative impact on the forest cover (positive impact on
R). Indeed, a larger population reduces the size allowed to each household. Each household
therefore raises the share of the most proﬁtable activity.
Consistently with a portfolio analysis, the portfolio share of the risk-free asset, i.e. NTFP
extraction, is positively correlated with its proﬁtability. A rise in forest proﬁtability could
come, for example, from a rise in the NTFP prices. A policy frequently advocated to reduce
tropical deforestation is the introduction of green labeling for NTFP in order to raise the
proﬁtability of the forests. Appendix C provides a numerical example of the coping and
diversiﬁcation strategies.
The precedent proposition ignores the fact that NTFP extraction from a common prop-
erty or free access forest can constitute a poverty trap, as an extreme case of a tragedy-of-
the-commons process. This case is studied in the next section.
104 Safety-net or poverty trap?
In this section, we build on Baland and Francois (2005). The share of agricultural land (R)
is now supposed to be ﬁxed, and not a choice variable anymore. The choice variable is now
the allocation of labor between the two activities. Moreover, the households are supposed
to have diﬀerent productivity on the agricultural land. We distinguish therefore skilled
and unskilled households. In contrast to the precedent section and because of household
heterogeneity, only unskilled households allocate some labor to CPR extraction.
The N households of the community allocate their unit of labor (Li = 1) between two
activities. First, labor can be allocated to a private project (e.g: private agriculture). Second,
it can be allocated to CPR extraction (e.g: NTFP extraction). In Baland and Francois, the
household allocate all its labor to one activity. In contrast, in the following model, each
household can divide its labor supply and allocate a share to both activities.
Baland and Francois consider successively a risk-free private project with heterogeneous
returns, and a risky private project with homogeneous returns. Conversely, we consider here
a risky private project with heterogeneous returns, while the CPR provides safe and homo-
geneous returns. Therefore, CPR extraction may have two motivations. First, households
have diﬀerent expected returns on their private project and the less skilled households allo-
cate all their labor to CPR extraction, and the CPR returns represent the minimum income
of the community. Second, the households face also diﬀerent levels of risk on their private
projects and allocate thus a share of their labor supply to CPR extraction in order to insure
themselves (note here that we assume the extreme case of no outside insurance possibili-
ties). Whereas Baland and Francois consider separately those two kinds of heterogeneity,
the model presented here study the possible poverty-trap implications of the coexistence of
these two role of the CPR: minimum income and insurance.
4.1 NTFP extraction as insurance and households heterogeneity
As in Baland and Francois (2005), we assume that all labor allocated to the CPR is equiv-
alently productive and receives the average product:
f(L).li
L , with li ∈ [0,1] the amount of
labor allocated to the CPR by household i and L =
  1
N li di the aggregate amount of labor
11allocated to the commons 4. The commons production function, f(L), is strictly increasing
and concave in L. Therefore, the average product is decreasing in L, which constitutes a
tragedy-of-the-commons eﬀect: labor allocated by one household has a negative externality
on the other households. Moreover, total labor allocated to the commons can be an indicator
of environmental damages. Indeed, the overuse of a resource coincides with the degradation
of the ecosystem. Note here that we assume that the CPR is de facto open access, and that
no joint management strategy is implemented to induce sustainable use.
As already said, the private projects provide uncertain returns 5. The expected private
project return of household i is E(xi).(1−li). In the worst case, the private project provides
xi.(1 − li). Note here that only E(xi) and xi (and not the whole distribution of the private
project returns) are needed to describe the households characteristics. We restrict ourselves
to the case of common risk, i.e. we deﬁne: xi = E(xi) − C. Where C is the same across
households. Expected returns, E(x), and minimum returns, x, constitute a representation
of the households heterogeneity in terms of skills and risk, respectively.
The households are sorted according to the expected return on their private project.
Household 1 has the lowest expected return and household N has the highest one.
Household’s objective: At the beginning of the period, each household chooses its labor
allocation between the two activities to maximize its expected return Π(li):
max
li




Moreover, the households need to insure a minimum consumption requirement Cmin in
the worst state of the world (i.e if xi occurs). We assume here that the minimum requirement
is the same across the population. We consider basic needs to survive, such as nutrition. If
this requirement is not met, concerned households cannot stay in the community and have
therefore to migrate. Migration is therefore considered here as an action of last resort if the
environment cannot insure their livelihood to some households. An important concern here
is whether migration provides the minimum requirement to migrating households. Indeed,
migrating is by itself a risky behavior. This concern is not explicitly considered here. The
4Note here that the size of the CPR is ﬁxed, and therefore not a choice variable.
5A ﬁrst-best outcome would therefore come from the introduction of an eﬃcient insurance market that
eliminate risk on the private project.
12important point is that some households have to migrate simply because their livelihood is
threatened.




Mi = 1 if (1 − li).xi + li
f(L)
L < Cmin




Thus households are risk neutral, as long as they get their minimum requirement, and
are inﬁnitely risk averse under that point. We deﬁne as poor a household not getting more
than its subsistence requirement: it cannot get more from its activities than what it needs
to survive. This set up is somehow unfamiliar, but seems to ﬁt with the reality of many
poor communities of developing countries. Indeed, the main objective of poor households
is likely to insure livelihood. Thus, it seems fair to assume that, in very poor communities,
households ﬁrst insure their livelihood, and then try to maximize their expected payoﬀ.
Two kinds of households decide not to migrate. First, private projects may be proﬁtable
enough for some households, even in the worst state of the world: xi ≥ Cmin. These house-
holds are naturally insured. Second, households properly insured by CPR extraction also
decide not to migrate. Thus CPR extraction needs to be proﬁtable enough to insure the
households properly, and the households need to allocate a minimum amount of labor to the











Return to CPR extraction is decreasing in total labor allocated. Thus, if too much labor
is allocated to the CPR, the average product goes down to its bottom value Cmin. Therefore,





If too many households are in need of insurance, the insurance capacity of the resource,
Lmax, may be too small. At this point, some households have to migrate and migration occurs
until the point at which every remaining household is insured, with the average return being
equal to the minimum requirement. Migration is considered here as an action of last resort:
the environment cannot provide to the households their livelihood, thus they have to leave.
13Households are therefore assumed to migrate from the area if and only if they cannot get their





Midi = S − Lmax (13)
with S the population in need of insurance:
S : xS = Cmin (14)
At equilibrium, three classes of households can be distinguished, related to their labor
allocation.
4.2 Classes of households at equilibrium
The equilibrium is a combination of a total amount of labor allocated to the commons, Lc, a
share of labor allocated to the commons by each household, li, and a number of households
that have to migrate, M.
At equilibrium, 3 classes of households can be distinguished according to the households
allocation of labor. Two classes are in need of insurance and therefore allocate a share of
their labor to CPR extraction, while the third one is ”naturally”insured.
Unskilled households: The less skilled households have an expected return on the private
project smaller or equal to the average product on the CPR. These households allocate all
their labor to the CPR. Therefore they get the average product.
For i ∈ [0;U] :

      










The motivation for CPR extraction here is a lack of better opportunity. Less skilled
households rely on this activity because it requires low skilled labor and provides higher
returns than their private projects.
14Skilled households: The most skilled households are those who get at least their minimum
requirement from their private project. Moreover, the expected return on their private
project must be greater than the average product on the CPR. Thus they allocate all their
labor to the private project. Their expected income is the expected private return.
For i ∈ [S;N] :

      








This class of household can be considered as ”naturally”insured: they always get enough
returns from their private project to satisfy their basic needs.
Middle class: This last class of household does not appear in Baland and Francois. For this
class, the private project is in expectation more proﬁtable than CPR extraction. However,
there are some states of the world in which this private project does not provide their
minimum requirement. Therefore they put some labor in CPR extraction in order to insure
themselves. Because the expected private project return is greater than the return on CPR
extraction, these households allocate labor on the CPR in order to get exactly their minimum
requirement in the worst state of the world.
For i ∈ [U;S] :

      











Lc + (1 − li).E(xi)
(17)
While in a world with perfect insurance, these middle-class households would allocate all
their labor to the private project and get its expected return, they need here to extract from
the CPR in order to insure themselves, at the expense of reducing their expected return.
Note here that S represents the population in need of insurance (unskilled and middle class).
The following table synthesizes the patterns of the diﬀerent classes in equilibrium.
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Lc + (1 − li).E(xi) E(xi)
In order to show how CPR extraction becomes a poverty trap, we need to determine
what is the total amount of labor in the CPR.
4.3 Total amount of labor in the CPR
Only two classes of household allocate labor to CPR extraction: the unskilled and the middle
class. First, the unskilled households allocate all their labor to the CPR. Note here that the
number of households classiﬁed in the unskilled class depends on the total amount of labor
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S : xS = Cmin
(19)
S therefore represents the population in need of insurance. The size of the population
in need of insurance is independent of the total amount of labor allocated to the CPR.
However, the total amount Lc inﬂuences the repartition between unskilled and middle-class
households.
CPR extraction constitutes a poverty trap if the average product of CPR extraction go
below the minimum requirement. In this case, CPR extraction cannot properly insure the
households. This situation occurs if too much labor is allocated to the CPR: L > Lmax.
In that case, both poor and middle-class households cannot get more than their minimum
requirement and allocate all their labor to CPR extraction. Moreover, M households have
to migrate until the average return
f(Lc)
Lc equals the minimum requirement Cmin.
16Thus, if CPR extraction does not constitute a poverty trap, the equilibrium amount of
labor allocated to the CPR is: 
   








Note here that the total amount of labor allocated to the CPR in the non-poverty-trap
case is a ﬁxed point of which the existence needs to be proven (see appendix C).
The equilibrium amount of labor allocated to the CPR in the poverty trap case is:

   




M = S − Lmax
(21)
At this point, it is possible to describe the two types of situation.
4.4 Tragedy of the commons and poverty trap
It is well known that an open-access resource suﬀers of a tragedy of the commons: individuals
do not take into account the negative externality of their actions on the others. In the case
studied here, with CPR used as insurance, this phenomenon may lead to a poverty trap:
the population in need of insurance (unskilled and middle class households) is trapped in
CPR extraction and cannot get more than their minimum requirement. Moreover, some
households have to migrate.
Insurance without poverty trap: We consider here the case where: Lc ≥ Lmax. There-
fore, the insurance use of the CPR does not lead to a poverty trap. Nevertheless, CPR
extraction is characterized by a tragedy-of-the-commons process. Note for example that
both unskilled and middle class households would be better oﬀ with an insurance scheme.
Indeed, middle class households could allocate all their labor to their private project, which
is more proﬁtable in expectation. Moreover, the unskilled households would be better oﬀ too,
because the labor supply allocated to the commons and thus the tragedy-of-the-commons
eﬀect would be lower. Therefore, the average product of CPR extraction would be bigger.










Lmax Lc S U
Figure 1: Insurance with no poverty trap and common risk
Insurance with poverty trap The poverty-trap case is a result of: S > Lc = Lmax.
More precisely, it is essentially an extreme consequence of the tragedy of the commons
described before. As already showed, M households have to migrate until the point at
which the average product of CPR extraction reach the minimum requirement. At this
point, middle class households have to allocate all their labor to the CPR in order to insure
themselves. Therefore, both unskilled and middle class households are perfectly insured
but cannot get more than their minimum requirement, which constitute a poverty trap (as
deﬁned in introduction). Figure 2 describes the poverty trap case. Note here that skilled












Figure 2: Insurance with poverty trap and common risk
The causes of the poverty trap: A poverty trap is therefore the result of two main
factors. First, population factors are important. If the population in need of insurance (S) is
big, the poverty trap case is more likely. The size of this population is a consequence of two
components: distribution of skills (E(x)) and distribution of risk (x). Firstly, the bigger is
the population with relatively high expected return on the private proﬁt, the smaller is the
unskilled population. Secondly, the smaller is the risk at which the households are exposed,
the bigger is the population that does not depend on the resource.
Second, the production function of the CPR determines the threshold of population
(Lmax) that could exploit it. If the environment is fragile, it is quickly saturated and the
threshold is low.
Proposition 2: In a context of risk on the private projects, such as agriculture, the
use of CPR extraction as insurance can lead to a poverty trap if the population in need of
insurance is too large and the resource has small capacity. Then, both unskilled and middle
19class households are trapped in CPR extraction and cannot get more than their basic needs
in return.
Proof: A poverty trap situation is characterized by: Lc = Lmax. S determine the
equilibrium amount of labor allocated to the CPR (Lc), while the capacity of the resource
determine the production function, and thus the maximum amount of labor allocated to the
CPR (Lmax).
As already mentioned, the poverty-trap situation is an extreme case of a tragedy of the
commons. The only diﬀerence in terms of welfare between those two cases is the fact that
the middle class de facto disappears when CPR extraction becomes a poverty trap. Indeed,
middle class households can insure themselves only at the cost of allocating all their labor to
the CPR. They lose therefore all the extra return they could get from their private project.
Only two classes of households remain in the society: the unskilled and the skilled households.
Moreover, as shown in Baland and Francois (2005), privatization may not be a good solu-
tion in terms of welfare, since the improved eﬃciency may not compensate for the reduction
of the insurance properties of the CPR.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to investigate the safety-net function of forest products in the
economics of land-use change and deforestation. We analyze the trade-oﬀ between two
land-uses. Agriculture is more proﬁtable but is risky. In contrast, NTFP extraction is
less proﬁtable but is used to smooth consumption or to ﬁll some consumption gaps when
agricultural crops are bad.
The ﬁrst model presented ignores some important features of poor agricultural house-
holds, which open opportunities for future research. First, households may compete for
NTFP extraction if the forest is open access. The potential poverty-trap implications that
NTFP extraction may create must then be taken into account. Indeed, if the population
in need of safety net is large, and if the forest capacity is small, a tragedy-of-the-commons
process may trap the less skilled households into NTFP extraction and deprive them of
20other development opportunities. The second model of the paper highlight this potential
implication.
Second, considering more explicitly labor market integration could point outside op-
portunities for households, that would reduce the safety-net role of NTFP extraction and
thus increase deforestation. Third, other types of risk-management could have several im-
plications on the land use. For example, agricultural households could use livestock as a
risk-management strategy, which could increase land clearing and deforestation. Fourth, the
statement of risk-free NTFP extraction should be moderated, because of the existence of risk
such as animal migration or price volatility. Finally, the two models presented are static,
while dynamic modeling could allow for accumulation as insurance.
However, although quite simple and not considering some important factors such as dy-
namic eﬀects or labor outside options, the model presented here stresses some important
implications. We predict that a reduction in crop risk may have a negative impact on forest
cover. Development policies often consider agricultural development as a priority. Moreover,
an important objective is to reduce risk on poor agricultural households’ income. There-
fore, to reduce this impact, risk reduction policies should be combined with environmental
and forest management policies. For example, payment for environmental services provided
by forests may be an interesting tool. Indeed this kind of payment may enhance forest
preservation and raise the ”proﬁtability”of forests.
Risk aversion of the household is positively correlated with forest cover. This result is
quite intuitive, since forest products are a tool to reduce risk. In the economic analysis,
households are typically more risk averse than entrepreneurs, generally risk neutral. Eco-
nomic development may raise through market integration the separability between the utility
and proﬁt maximizing process. Households may become less risk averse, which could have
a negative impact on forest cover. Moreover, market integration should provide to house-
holds new insurance and credit mechanisms, reducing the safety-net use of forest products
described in this paper. This kind of market integration can thus indirectly lead to more
deforestation.
Agricultural risk and the safety-net use of NTFP extraction is therefore an crucial issue
with important economic and environmental implications such as deforestation, poverty-trap
and degradation of commonly-held forests. Some empirical analysis of the relationships that
21link agricultural risk, poverty and deforestation could give interesting indications. Moreover,
a natural extension of this paper would be to allow for land-use and labor allocation to be
choice variables at the same time.
Finally a related issue is the study of potential conﬂicts of interest between local commu-
nities using the resource and forest loggers. In this context, corruption and lobbying powers
have an important role, that could lead, for the local communities, to the deprivation of the
resource.
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Appendix A: comparative statics
Proof of proposition 1: we take the ﬁrst derivatives of the optimal share of agricultural
land R∗ with respect to our variables of interest. We deﬁne a risk reduction as a rise in x











































] < 0 (25)
Appendix B: a numerical illustration
The values of the variables (table 1) are adapted from Angelsen (1995, 1999). They corre-
spond as far as possible to a household survey done in the Seberida district, Riau, Sumatra.
For the variables not corresponding to the survey (i.e δ, x, x, f and α), we use values corre-
sponding to the basic conditions of the model ((3), (2)).
23Table 1: Parameter values of the numerical simulation
Variable Symbol Initial value Adapted value
Total land area H 1932 1
Number of households N 82 0.042
Expected output in agriculture E(x) 500 0.26
Low level of output x n.a 0.15
High level of output x n.a 0.37
Forest products intensity f n.a 0.22
Probability of x δ n.a 0.5
Absolute Risk Aversion coeﬃcient α n.a 0.5
n.a : not available
Source: Angelsen (1995, 1999)
Table 2: Results of the numerical simulation
Change in parameters Diversiﬁcation
Initial situation Cf Table 2 0.29
Risk reduction x = 0.36 ; x = 0.16 0.36
Forest proﬁtability f = 0.2 0.47
f = 0.24 0.14
Risk aversion α = 0.3 0.48
α = 0.7 0.21
24Appendix C: Lc as a ﬁxed point
The total amount of labor allocated to the CPR in the non-poverty-trap case is a ﬁxed point.
First, we need to prove that U(Lc) + LM
c (Lc) is decreasing in Lc.
Note that U(Lc) is decreasing in Lc. Indeed the number of unskilled people is deﬁned as:
E(xU) ≤ Y (Lc)/Lc, which is decreasing in Lc by assumption.
Therefore, if Lc increases, some households pass from the unskilled class to the middle
class. Those households reduce the amount of labor allocated to the CPR. Indeed, the un-
skilled households allocate all their labor to the CPR, while middle-class households allocate
only a share of it.
Overall, an increase of Lc induces a reduction in labor allocated by the unskilled class,
which over-compensate the raise in labor allocated by the middle-class households. It follows
that the total amount of labor allocated to the CPR decreases.
Second, U(Lc)+LM
c (Lc) is positive, as the amount of labor allocated by insurance-seeking
households is necessarily positive. It follows that Lc = U(Lc) + LM
c (Lc) is a ﬁxed point.
References
Agarwal, B. (1991). Social security and the family: coping with seasonnality and calamity
in rural India, pages 171–244. Social Security in Developing Countries, Ahmad, E.J. and
Dreze, J. and Hills, J. and Sen, A. (eds.), Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Aldermann, H. and Paxson, C. (1994). Do the poor insure ? A synthesis of the litterature
on risk and consumption in developing countries, volume 4. Economics in a changing world,
London, mcmillan edition.
Angelsen, A. (1995). Shifting cultivation and deforestation: A study from indonesia. World
Development, 23(10).
Angelsen, A. (1999). Agricultural expansion and deforestation: Modelling the impact of
population, market forces and property rights. Journal of Development Economics, 58:185–
218.
25Angelsen, A., Sunderlin, W., Ahmad Dermawan, D., and Rianto, E. (2001). Economic
crisis, small farmer well-being, and forest cover change in indonesia. World Development,
29(5).
Angelsen, A. and Wunder, S. (2002). Exploring the forest-poverty link. CIFOR Occasional
Paper n40.
Azariadis, C. and Stachurski, J. (2006). Poverty traps, pages 295–384. Handbook Of
Economic Growth, Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. (eds.), Elsevier.
Baland, J. and Francois, P. (2005). Commons as insurance and the welfare impact of
privatization. Journal of Public Economics, 89(2-3):211–231.
Barbier, E. (2000). Links between economic liberalization and rural resource degradation
in the developing countries. Agricultural Economics, 23:299–310.
Bluﬀstone, R. (1995). The eﬀect of labor market performance on deforestation in develop-
ping countries under open access: An example from rural nepal. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 29:42–63.
Bromley, D. and Chavas, J. (1989). On risk, transactions and economic development in the
semiarid tropics. Economic Development and Cultural Change, pages 719–736.
Byron, N. and Arnold, M. (1997). What future for the people of the tropical forests?
CIFOR Working Paper n19.
Das Gupta, M. (1987). Informal security mechanisms and population retention in rural
india. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36(1):101–120.
Das Gupta, M. and Maler, K. (1993). Handbook of development economics, volume 3,
chapter Poverty and the Environmental Resource Base. University of Cambridge.
Dercon, S. (2002). Income risk, coping strategies and safety nets. The World Bank Research
Observer, 17(2):141–166.
FAO (1992). Forest resources assessment, tropical countries. Technical report, FAO, Rome;
FAO. Forestry Paper n112.
26Jodha, N. (1986). Common property resources and rural poor in dry regions of india.
Economic and Political Weekly, 21(27):1169–1182.
Kaimowitz, D. and Angelsen, A. (1998). Economic models of tropical deforestation: a
review. CIFOR, www.cgiar.org/cifor.
Kaimowitz, D. and Angelsen, A. (1999). Rethinking the causes of deforestation: Lessons
from economic models. The World Bank Research Observer, 14(1).
Kumar, S. (2002). Does participation in common pool resource management help the
poor? a social cost-beneﬁt analysis of joint forest management in jharkland, india. World
Development, 30(5):763–782.
Lopez, R. (1986). Structural models of the farm household that allow for interdependent
utility and proﬁt-maximisation decisions, chapter 11. Johns Hopkins University Press, Bal-
timore, MD.
Lopez, R. (1998). Agricultural intensiﬁcation, common property resources and the farm-
household. Environmental and Resource Economics, 11(3-4).
Myer, N. (1992). Tropical forests; the policy challenge. Environmentalist, 12(1).
Neumann, R. and Hirsch, E. (2000). Commercialisation of non-timber forest products: a
review. Technical report, CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia and FAO, Rome.
Parks, P., Barbie, E., and Burgess, J. (1998). The economics of forest land use in temperate
and tropical areas. Environmental and Resource Economics, 11(3-4).
Pattanayak, S. and Sills, E. (2001). Do tropical forests provide natural insurance? the
microeconommics of non-timber forest product collection in the brazilian amazon. Land
Economics, 77(4):595–612.
Reddy, S. and Chakravaty, S. (1999). Forest dependence and income distribution in a
subsistence economy. World Development, 27(7):1141–1149.
Repetto, R. and Gillis, M., editors (1988). Public Policies and the Misuse of Forest Re-
sources. Cambridge University Press.
27Ros-Tonen, M. and Wiersum, F. (2003). The importance of non-timber forest products for
forest-based rural livelihoods: an evolving research agenda. AGIDS.
Shiferaw, B. and Holden, S. (2000). Policy instruments for sustainable land management:
The case of highland smallholders in ethiopia. Agricultural Economics, 22:217–232.
Shiferaw, B. and Holden, S. (2004). Land degradation, drought and food security in a less-
favoured area in the ethiopian highlands: a bio-economic model with market imperfections.
Agricultural Economics, 30:31–49.
Singh, I., Squire, L., and Strauss, J., editors (1986). Agricultural household models: Exten-
sions, Applications and Policy. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.
Sydorovych, O. (2001). Economics of the forest land use in developing countries a brief
literature survey. North Carolina State University.
Taylor, E. and Adelman, I. (2003). Agricultural household models: Genesis, evolution, and
extensions. Review of Economics of the Households, 1(1).
Torkamani, J. and Haji-Rahimi, M. (2001). Evaluation of farmer’s risk attitudes using alter-
natives utility functional forms. Journal of Agricultural Science and Techonology, 3:243–248.
UNEP (2003). Geo 2003. chapitre 2: Les forets. Technical report, UNEP, www.unep.org.
Wollenberg, E. and Ingles, A. (1998). Incomes from the forest. methods for the development
and conservation of forest products for local communities. Technical report, CIFOR, Bogor,
Indonesia.
WorldBank (2001). A revised forest strategy for the world bank group. Technical report,
World Bank, Washington D.C.
Wunder, S. (2001a). Poverty alleviation and tropical forests: What scope for synergies?
World Development, 29(11):1817–1833.
Wunder, S. (2001b). Poverty alleviation and tropical forests. what scope for synergies?
World Development, 29(11).
28